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ABSTRACT 
Krisis keuangan di Asia Timur menyebar dari Thailand ke Indonesia dan negara-
negara lainnya di kawasan Asia Timur melalui pasar uang dan pasar modal di mana mata 
uang lokal terdepresiasi dengan cepat dan dalam jumlah yang besar. 
Akibat dari krisis tersebut terhadap kemiskinan sangat cepat karena depresiasi mata 
uang lokal mengindikasikan kenaikan harga-harga umum secara tiba-tiba, terutama harga 
makanan yang sebagian besar merupakan produk impor. Inflasi tersebut kemudian dengan 
serius mempengaruhi rakyat miskin karena mereka tidak mampu untuk mencukupi 
kebutuhan pangan. Konsekuensinya, kemiskinan meningkat dan proporsi populasi yang 
berada di bawah garis kemiskinan meningkat pula. 
Untungnya, inflasi yng tinggi pada tahun 1998 sebesar 78 persen dapat dikontrol 
dengan cepat dan inflasi tersebut menurun hingga hanya 2 persen pada tahun 1999 dan 
kemudian kembali ke “normal” sekitar 10 persen pada periode 2000-2001. Penurunan 
harga bahan pangan secara otomatis pula menurunkan jumlah rakyat miskin hingga 50 
persen. Ini disebut sebagai “transient poverty”. 
Indonesia pada saat ini masih menghadapi krisis keuangan dan perbankan, namun 
posisi ekonomi masyarakat, termasuk rakyat miskin, telah kembali ke keadaan normal. 
Ekonomi rakyat memang membuktikan kemampuannya untuk bertahan di tengah krisis. 
Namun demikian, sangat disayangkan bahwa media masih terus membesar-besarkan krisis 
keuangan yang merefleksikan kepentingan sektor swasta agar tidak perlu ditekan untuk 
mengembalikan utang mereka yang sangat besar jumlahnya. 
Kata kunci: Krisis moneter, kemiskinan sementara, IDT. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Unlike many other countries, developing as 
well as developed, poverty problem in 
Indonesia is more difficult to solve because 
both the poverty condition, and its opposite the 
wealth and affluence, are not considered 
proper to be seen by others. It is true that in the 
cities people tend to show off and live more 
luxuriously. But in the rural areas if people 
were asked whether they are poor or rich, they 
would say, “not enough” (poor) or “just 
enough” (wealthy). That is why when D.H. 
Penny and Masri Singarimbun reported their 
research findings of extreme poverty in rural 
Java in 1972 (Sriharjo in Imogiri, Yogyakarta) 
their friends including some economists and 
sociologists advised them not to publish it too 
soon in Indonesia, because “the government 
officials would be very angry”. Hence the 
report was published in a monograph form in 
Cornell University in 1973, and only three 
years later it was published in a book form in 
Indonesia. By that time poverty problem was 
already discussed publicly even by the 
President in public speechs.
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Almost 20 years later in 1993, when the 
government was seriously considering policies 
and programs on poverty alleviation by 
introducing the IDT program (Presidential 
Decree on Left-behind villages), the decision 
to name some 32 percent of Indonesian 
villages as poor (left behind villages, the result 
of a scientific survey by CBS), was rejected by 
some Governors who do not wish their regions 
classified as poor regions having many poor 
population. In some other regions the people 
were delighted to receive poverty grant of Rp 
60 million per village from the central 
government as revolving funds but objected-
to-be-called poor. 
In 1997-98 when the financial crisis 
erupted, well known as krismon, inflation 
reached 78% in one year. Poverty increased 
because the prices of basic needs especially 
rice skyrocketed and a large number of people 
were laid off due to the business bankruptcies. 
Due to this very high inflation, the government 
(CBS) announced (mistakenly) that poverty 
had reached 49 percent or 79 million people. 
Understandably the government official was 
panicky and with the help of the World Bank 
and the UN introduced in a hurry the social 
safety net programs patterned after a similar 
program in Russia after the crisis in the early 
nineties, which is not appropriate for 
Indonesia. UNICEF was talking about “the lost 
generation”. One of the first problems was the 
distinction between “new poor” caused by the 
financial crisis and the “old poor” which was 
there already at the onset of the crisis. This of 
course creates a lot of confusion, and 
“leakages” of fund occurred everywhere, from 
outright corruptions to the case of fund being 
given to the non-poor. Finally it was realized 
that there is indeed the so-called transient 
poverty amounted to one-third up to one half of 
the total poor people reported. The transient 
poverty was able to move from poor to non-
poor automatically after general prices fell 
back from its peak during the crisis (1998). To 
neglect the existence of transient poverty 
become the sources of inflated number of 
poverty and become one of the sources of 
many misuses of the SSN poverty alleviation 
funds. 
Now, more than 5 years after the crisis, 
there are still many people including noted 
economists who do not understand the real 
nature of poverty in Indonesia. Many of them 
still believe that poverty in Indonesia is still as 
serious as during the crisis or becoming even 
worse. They like to mention the 40 millions 
people unemployed which can only be 
absorbed through investment by big businesses 
especially foreign investors. They never see or 
never want to see the growing ekonomi rakyat, 
which have absorbed the unemployment of the 
formal-modern sectors. These orthodox macro 
economists refuse to distinguish between open 
unemployment and disguised unemployment 
by saying that “they cannot afford to become 
fully unemployed”. This is not incorrect but 
surely they never accept the fact that ekonomi 
rakyat has been playing a big role in 
Indonesian economy and become even bigger 
during and after the krismon. Many of them 
like to mention the growing criminalities due 
to the economic crisis, but failed to recognize 
that indeed Indonesia is facing total crisis 
resulting from multidimensional crisis, while 
economic crisis or better financial crisis, is 
only one of them 
We believe that stating that Indonesia is 
having only economic crisis, which can be 
remedied by macroeconomic policies, is a big 
mistake, if not a fatal mistake of economic 
analysis. 
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
Another reason why it is even more 
difficult to tackle poverty problem in Indonesia 
is the nonseparability of poverty and social 
inequality. Poverty is indeed one form of 
extreme inequality, which has become 
increasingly serious when economic develop-
ment reached conglomeration stage at the late 
eighties. On the one hand, there was the feeling 
of relief and complacency among some 
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Indonesian as well as foreigner that Indonesian 
economy had entered Asian miracle or tiger 
economy stage. But on the other hand there are 
people in the ekonomi rakyat sector who felt 
more and more squeezed, impoverished, and 
left-behind. This was exactly the economic fact 
of life in the early nineties when the World 
Bank published The East Asian Miracle (1993) 
and Indonesia was included as one of the eight 
miracles in East and Southeast-Asia, while at 
the very same year the Indonesian People’s 
Assembly warned about the growing social 
arrogance and social envies. This is the strange 
contradiction which the financial crisis 4 years 
later made many people taken by surprise, 
including many expatriate economists, because 
Indonesian “economic fundamentals” were 
considered very healthy.  
If poverty was “hidden” at the beginning of 
the first Five Year Plan (1969), the appearance 
of inequalities at the end of that Plan was 
protested immediately by student movement. 
The Malari affair (January 1974) had indeed 
proved that inequality was not tolerated 
especially if it was caused by foreign capital, at 
that time it was Japanese investment. Even if 
Malari affair had prompted the government to 
issue various equity programs, it was not 
sufficient to encourage the shift of develop-
ment strategy away from the growth-oriented 
to equity-oriented strategy. Every Repelita has 
given bigger and more important role to the 
private sector through the deregulation or 
liberalization policies on trade and capital 
reaching the peak with very liberal “October 
88 package”, which was reported to be even 
more liberal than in the most liberal country in 
the world, the USA. The result is clear, the 
growing strength of the conglomerates and the 
weakening of ekonomi rakyat. The World 
Bank Jakarta office that has helped developing 
the process of conglomeration warned the 
Indonesian government in 1993 of the danger 
of the growing concentration of conglomerates, 
but apparently was not given due attention. On 
the other hand the government seems to 
welcome the growing number and strength of 
conglomerates to play the role of “competing” 
with the MNC, which had “invaded” 
Indonesian economy. 
The government did not seem to realize 
that conglomeration initiated and deepen the 
process of growing inequalities because the 
national conglomerates joined hands with the 
global conglomerates to squeeze ekonomi 
rakyat even further and increased the gap 
between the rich and the strong with the poor 
and the weak. This process of the widening 
gap has never been checked because through 
the liberalization policy the government 
“sided” with the strong and the conglomerates. 
Hence the attack of krismon in 1997-98 
was indeed like the Bali blast, the explosion of 
the “time bomb” destroying the Indonesian 
financial sector especially the banking sector. 
The banking sector was severely crushed 
because through the liberalization policy the 
government let the growing number of banks 
from 70 to 240 banks without proper 
government control, many of them owned and 
built by the conglomerates, to collect fund 
from general public but to lend only to 
themselves. Strangely enough, if we can call it 
that, the government continue to side with the 
greedy conglomerates by giving Bank 
Indonesia Liquidity loan (BLBI) amounted Rp 
140 trillion to bail out the Bankers’ debt to 
their clients which are mostly the owners of the 
banks themselves. This wrong policy was 
followed by the issuance of government bonds 
to finance the Banking Recapitalization 
program, resulting the large government 
budget deficit, because the interest of the bond 
represented some 20 percent of the national 
budget. This banking recapitalization program 
is the most recent and clearest evidence of 
inequitable policy to side with the 
conglomerates on the one hand, and on the 
other hand to neglect the interest of the 
ekonomi rakyat, the economy of the small 
people. Only if this inequitable policy is 
recognized then we can find ways of economic 
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reform to correct the mistaken economic 
strategy of the New Order era (1966-1998). 
 
POVERTY ALLEVIATION STRATEGY 
Indonesia is a very large and diverse 
country, so that the nature of its poverty also 
varies from region to region. It is clear 
therefore that one national strategy of poverty 
alleviation cannot be expected to achieve its 
target in all regions. Most of the time a 
national program may succeed or fail to 
achieve its goals only partly, or a particular 
program must be “adjusted” to local conditions 
in such a way that the original goals or targets 
were lost. The Social Safety Net (JPS) 
program for example, as the poverty 
alleviation program to minimize the negative 
impact of krismon, even if it was evaluated to 
have failed, yet it was considered as 
“successful” in disbursing and channeling 
funds to the people in the regions. In other 
words if the fund is disbursed 100 percent, the 
program must be considered successful 
without the need to ask whether or not poverty 
in certain region has been reduced. For 
example, the Rice-OPK program even if in the 
beginning it created a lot of confusion because 
the disagreements of poverty data in the 
regions, yet finally the cheap subsidized rice 
programs can be implemented “smoothly” 
although it was generally recognized that a 
large portion ended up being received by the 
non-poor. 
The PDMDKE project (revolving credit 
program) was the least successful one, because 
it was reported to “continue” the IDT program, 
but can not avoid making distinction between 
the “new poor” as a result of the krismon, and 
the “old poor” that have previously received 
the IDT fund. This distinction between the old 
and the new poor was of course confusing 
because it then assumed that the previous IDT 
program has succeeded to abolish poverty 
everywhere. The PDMDKE project not inten-
tionally destroys the administrative system 
carefully built up by 123,000 community 
groups (Pokmas IDT) in the whole country.  
The SSN program on health and education 
(scholarship) has been well reported in the 
sense that corruption is very small although 
there are reports of the non-poor receiving the 
fund. The IFLS 2+ and IFLS 3 reported that 
the Posyandu visitors declined and that of the 
private hospitals and private clinic increasing. 
The family expenditure on health was reported 
to decline, but health condition of the family 
was not seriously deteriorating or even 
improving in some regions. 1 
The SSN scholarship has been reported to 
reach all schools but poor children are no more 
likely to receive this scholarship than the non-
poor children. The program was designed to 
target students not the general child 
population. In Indonesia the role of parents and 
communities to help fund the school finance is 
very important that a financial crisis of 1998 
did not seriously influence negatively the 
school finance situation.  
The experience of the IDT program indi-
cated very clearly that community participation 
is a conditio sine qua non in poverty 
alleviation program. It is indeed emphasized in 
the beginning of the program that the program 
must be transferred as quickly as possible to 
become a community movement, organized and 
managed by the community themselves for its 
sustainability. The IDT program is a program 
to empower ekonomi rakyat, which with the 
help of revolving fund granted by the 
government able to move and dinamize the 
village economy. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Poverty in Indonesia is not more severe 
than in other developing countries. However it 
looked more difficult to solve because the 
government and the general public never 
                                               
1 UGM-RAND, Indonesian Living Standards Three Years 
After the Crisis: Evidence from The Indonesia Family 
Life Survey, Executive Summary, 2002:17 
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consider it to be a very serious problem 
requiring top priorities in national development 
programs. 
The economists who have been promoted 
as the “elite in national economic develop-
ment” during the New Order Era have the 
strong view that poverty can be solved 
automatically via economic growth. Thus after 
the financial crisis of 1997-98 they argue 
repeatedly that economic growth must be 
recovered to the pre-crisis level (7 percent 
annually) and poverty will be reduced automa-
tically. 
This trickle down strategy of economic 
development, even if it has failed to 
materialize during the 3 decades of economic 
development, still believed to be true and will 
take place, and thus there is, according to 
them, no need to shift the strategy into 
poverty-oriented strategy. Even after the Bali 
blast on October 12, now these ortodox 
economists are busy debating what is the 
“reasonable” growth rate for 2003, whether it 
will be 4-5 percent or 2-3 percent. If at present 
economists prefer to use their time and energy 
to talk about the feasible growth rate, not about 
how to unravel the real causes of the blast, we 
will never succeed to reduce poverty in 
Indonesia. The economists still rely too much 
on orthodox macroeconomic policies especial-
ly the monetary policies with the IMF advice. 
Another implication of the application of 
the orthodox economic development strategy 
in universities and schools is the fact that 
economics in Indonesia has been studied and 
taught only deductively. The professors in the 
universities and economics teachers in high 
school are all preaching economics as a 
universal science almost as if a religion. They 
must beware the following warnings. 
Economic science has produced mostly 
“universal” intellectuals. I think it is time 
for economists to start transforming 
themselves 
__
 and to do it fast 
__
 into more 
“specific”, humble intellectuals (Alejandro 
Sanz de Santamaria in Ekins and Max-
Neef, 1992:20). 
The false preachings of economics of the 
modern era bore a large responsibility for 
the breakdown of the family, the crime, the 
indifference to suffering, the assault on the 
natural environment, and other grave 
failings of the world of the late 20th 
century. (Nelson, 2001:321) 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Poverty Figures (head count) in 13 provinces surveyed 
No Province 
Urban Rural Difference 1997-2000 
1997       2000 1997        2000 Urban        Rural 
1. North Sumatera 5,3           6,3 24,1         19,7 1,0          -4,4 
2. West Sumatera -               - 10,6         10,8 -               0,2 
3. South Sumatera -               - 37,7         23,3 -           -14,4 
4. Lampung -               - 28,2         18,9 -             -9,3 
5. Jakarta Cap. Ter. 6,0           6,6 -               - 0,6               - 
6. West Java 13,8         13,5 14,0         18,6 -0,3          4,6 
7. Central Java 20,4         14,3 13,7         17,1 -5,9          3,4 
8. Jogyakarta S.R 11,3         11,3 12,9         14,7 0              1,8 
9. East Java 21,2         13,5 24,5         20,2 -7,7         -4,3 
10. Bali -               - 22,2         15,6 -              -6,6 
11. West Nusatenggara -               - 19,0         30,9 -             11,9 
12. South Kalimantan -               - 18,0         10,6 -             -7,4 
13. South Sulawesi 21,4           15,9 34,0         24,7 -5,5        -9,3 
 Overall 13,3           11,6 20,1         18,7 -1,7         -1,4 
Source : UGM-RAND, Indonesian Living Standards Three Years After The Crisis: Evidence From The 
Indonesia Family Life Survey, Final Report, August 2002 
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Table 2. Poverty Line and Population in Poverty in Indonesia 1976 – 1999 
Year 
 
Poverty Line 
Population in Poverty 
(percent) 
Total Population in Poverty 
(million) 
(Percapita/Rp/month) 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Total 
Change 
(%) 
Urban Rural Total 
Change 
(%) 
1976   4.552   2.849 30.8 40.4 40.1 - 10.0 44.2 54.2 - 
1978   4.969   2.981 30.8 33.4 33.3 -6.8 8.3 38.9 47.2 -7,0 
1980   6.831   4.449 29.0 28.4 28.6 -4.7 9.5 32.8 42.3 -4.9 
1981   9.777   5.877 28.1 26.5 26.9 -1.7 9.3 31.3 40.6 -1.7 
1984 13.730   7.746 23.1 21.2 21.6 -5.2 9.3 25.7 35 5.6 
1987 17.381 10.294 20.1 16.1 17.4 -4.2 9.7 20.3 30 5.0 
1990 20.614 13.295 16.8 14.3 15.1 -2.3 9.4 17.8 27.2 -2.8 
1993 27.905 18.244 13.4 13.8 13.7 -1.4 8.7 17.2 25.9 -1.3 
1996 38.246 27.413 9.7 12.3 11.3 -2.3 7.2 15.3 22.5 -3.4 
1996a 42.032 31.366 13.6 19.9 17.7 - 9.6 24.9 34.5 - 
Dec-98 96.959 72.78 21.9 25.7 24.2 6.5 17.6 31.9 49.5 15.0 
Feb. 1999 92.409 74.272 19.5 26.1 23.5 -0.7 15.7 32.7 48.4 -1.1 
   (19.4) (26.0) (23.4)  (15.6) (32.4) (48,0)  
Ags. 1999 89.845 69.42 15.1 20.2 18.2 -5.3 12.4 25.1 37.5 -10.9 
   (15.0) (20.0) (18.0)  (12.3) (24.8) (37,1)  
2000     19.0    37.3  
2001     18.4    37.1  
2002   14.3 20.5 17.9      
Source: CSA (BPS), 2000 
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Table 3: Human Development Index, 1996 - 1999 
Province 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index  
Education 
Index 
Purchasing 
Power Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Ranking 
 1996      1999  1996    1999   1996   1999   1996   1999   1996   1999 
(1) (2)         (3) (4)       (5) (6)        (7) (8)        (9) (10)     (11) 
Aceh Special Region  
North Sumatera  
West Sumatera 
Riau 
Jambi 
South Sumatera 
Bengkulu 
Lampung 
Capital Territory of Jakarta 
West Java 
Central Java  
S R Yogyakarta 
East Java  
Bali 
West Nusa Tenggara  
East Nusa Tenggara 
West Kalimantan 
Central Kalimantan  
South Kalimantan  
East Kalimantan 
North Sulawesi  
Central Sulawesi 
South Sulawesi 
Southeast Sulawesi  
Maluku 
Irian Jaya 
69,0 
67,8 
64,7 
69,8 
67,5 
65,2 
64,7 
65,8 
75,3 
63,2 
66,3 
74,8 
64,7 
71,8 
49,8 
62,0 
63,2 
72,2 
58,8 
71,8 
69,3 
59,3 
66,7 
64,3 
63,5 
62,8 
71,0 
70,2 
67,5 
71,3 
69,3 
67,5 
67,0 
68,2 
76,8 
65,5 
72,2 
76,5 
67,5 
74,2 
54,7 
64,3 
65,2 
73,7 
60,0 
73,3 
69,3 
62,8 
72,2 
66,7 
70,7 
65,8 
75,5 
79,7 
76,5 
77,5 
75,5 
73,8 
75,6 
73,0 
85,6 
73,9 
66,5 
68,5 
63,9 
67,0 
55,6 
64,2 
65,1 
77,2 
73,8 
76,2 
80,8 
74,8 
66,5 
72,2 
77,8 
56,1 
78,1 
81,5 
79,6 
80,0 
77,5 
77,0 
77,3 
75,3 
86,8 
76,5 
69,9 
74,5 
67,4 
70,3 
60,2 
66,8 
67,9 
78,9 
76,4 
79,7 
81,6 
77,3 
69,9 
73,2 
80,8 
59,9 
63,6 
64,0 
66,4 
64,4 
64,8 
65,0 
64,9 
63,9 
67,4 
67,4 
68,1 
72,2 
68,0 
71,4 
64,6 
56,5 
62,6 
64,5 
66,3 
66,1 
65,3 
65,0 
64,8 
62,1 
63,2 
61,7 
34,3 
34,7 
38,2 
37,1 
35,7 
28,9 
33,6 
34,9 
43,6 
40,3 
40,3 
45,1 
40,0 
42,2 
32,2 
31,8 
31,1 
28,5 
37,7 
38,8 
37,6 
27,1 
34,2 
30,0 
31,5 
31,3 
69,4 
70,5 
69,2 
70,6 
69,3 
68,0 
68,4 
67,6 
76,1 
68,2 
67,0 
71,8 
65,5 
70,1 
56,7 
60,9 
63,6 
71,3 
66,3 
71,4 
71,8 
66,4 
66,0 
66,2 
68,2 
60,2 
61,1 
62,1 
61,8 
62,8 
60,8 
57,8 
59,3 
59,4 
69,1 
60,8 
60,8 
65,4 
58,3 
62,2 
46,0 
54,3 
54,7 
60,4 
58,0 
63,9 
63,7 
55,7 
58,8 
56,6 
61,0 
52,3 
9 
7 
11 
6 
10 
15 
12 
16 
1 
13 
17 
2 
22 
8 
26 
24 
23 
5 
19 
4 
2 
18 
21 
20 
13 
25 
9 
7 
8 
5 
11 
20 
16 
15 
1 
11 
11 
2 
18 
6 
26 
24 
23 
14 
19 
3 
4 
22 
17 
21 
10 
25 
Indonesia 66.7 68,6 72.0 74.8 65.2 35.4 69,0 59.6   
Source: UNDP – UNSFIR, 2000 
 
